About
Mustafa Hijri
Ever since the Islamic fundamentalists imposed their rule on Iran following the revolution of 1979, the clerical regime's policies have puzzled Western politicians, journalists and academics. In addition to this sense of puzzlement, some people in the West assume that there are genuine divisions among the factions within the clerical establishment.
Such an assumption derives in part from the observation that there are multiple views and voices within the regime. On some occasions these voices convey messages of total defiance against international norms of conduct. On other occasions they make cryptic statements about possible changes in the regime's terrorist behavior. However, inferring the existence of genuine divisions among these factions on the basis of such messages leads to a misapprehension of contemporary Iran. This misapprehension is fuelled by the fact that officials of the Islamic Republic simultaneously express contradictory positions, leading the outside world to believe that the regime is amenable to change.
However, for those of us in the Iranian Opposition, neither the rhetoric nor the conduct of the Islamic Republic is puzzling or enigmatic. Rather, what we are puzzled by is the outside world's belief in a genuine diversity within the regime.
The contradictory statements by the regime's leaders, its Janus face manifested in a "hardliner" such as Ahmadinejad and "moderate" representatives are nothing but expressions and features of the same violent political setup that has terrorized the peoples of Iran for more than 28 years.
Another aspect of the outside world's misapprehension of Iran is the perception and representation of Iran as a monolithic society in terms of national, religious and cultural identity.
As a result, misrepresentations – or rather concealment – of the country's true national, cultural and religious diversity in conjunction with erroneous beliefs about the Iranian theocracy have underpinned the outside world's understanding of and approach towards our country.
Moreover, despite the clerical regime's continuous sponsoring of global terrorism and in spite of its quest for weapons of mass destruction, some people outside of Iran still believe in the existence of "moderate" factions within the regime. They seem to believe that those factions will put Iran on the path of democratization and reorient the country's foreign policy.
Some European governments have pursued a policy of "constructive dialogue" coupled with trade to achieve that end, whereas the United States has utilized sanctions to bring about change in the clerical regime's behavior. Neither the European nor the U.S. approach toward Iran has yielded positive results, however.
Given that diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to halt uranium enrichment are doomed to failure, three options remain: to take military action against the clerical regime, to bring about regime-change by supporting Iran's democratic Opposition or to accept Iran as a state with nuclear weapons.
Although the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in December 2007 concluded "with high confidence" that Iran halted its program for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in 2003, it did not alter the United States' threat-perception of Iran. In his recent trip to the Middle East, President Bush stated in a speech: "Iran's actions threaten the security of nations everywhere."
It should come as no surprise that the NIE report did not alter U.S. threat-perception of Iran, since the clerical regime constitutes a five-part threat. Beside the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the regime is the foremost sponsor of terrorism and assassination worldwide. Moreover, it does everything in its power to hinder peace between Israelis and Palestinians and supports various terrorist groups in the region. Iran also poses a direct security threat to the countries in the Gulf.
Furthermore, experts on nuclear proliferation and some former U.S. officials have disputed the conclusions of the NIE on several points. The most crucial argument in this regard is that the report's distinction between "civilian" and "military" programs in the case of Iran is untenable. The fact that Iran continues the enrichment of uranium implies that it could be used for civilian as well as military purposes. In addition, a number of legitimate questions have been left unanswered by the clerical regime: Why does Iran need nuclear power when the country is well endowed with petroleum and gas resources? Why does Iran develop missiles that are designed to be armed with nuclear warheads if the regime's intent is not the acquisition of nuclear weapons?
We, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI), believe that only regime-change in Iran will realize the Iranian people's quest for liberty and dignity as well as the outside world's vision of Iran as a force for the good within the International Community.
It is high time for the West to adopt a long-term strategy to bring about regime-change in Iran by supporting the democratic and secular forces inside as well as outside of the country.
For those who have any doubts about such a policy, we invoke (in addition to the five-part threat that Iran poses to international peace and security) the clerical regime's practice of systematic violations of human rights and its brutal oppression of the country's various ethnic, religious and national communities.
We also believe that a nuclear-armed clerical regime in Iran, with its terrorist mindset, is dangerous for the entire Middle East due to the risk of nuclear proliferation in an already volatile and war-prone part of the world.
Some of the neighboring countries sudden and simultaneous interest in nuclear power in the second half of 2007 is a warning sign of the frightening scenario that would unfold. A nuclear-armed Iran will feel emboldened to use its terrorist groups in Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere to blackmail the United States, other Western powers and countries in the Middle East.
Bearing in mind that the experience in Iraq has resulted in skepticism towards regime-change through foreign military intervention, the task of regime-change in Iran should be left to the Iranian Opposition. This would relieve the United States and its allies of the type of burden they have shouldered in Iraq and, more importantly, no one would be able to doubt the moral and political legitimacy of regime-change from within Iran.
However, such a strategy will not succeed without having as one of its central pillars genuine support for the ethnic and national diversity in Iran. Support for this diversity is also of strategic importance for democracy in Iran.
As long as Iran derives a substantial portion of its income from the sale of petroleum, there will be no incentives for the country's rulers to adhere to calls for popular sovereignty or democracy. This is often the case with regimes that become financially independent of their population. It is in this regard that Iran's national and ethnic diversity will be of strategic importance for democracy in the country and thereby a key component for stability in the Middle East. Provided that there is real support for the creation of a multinational federation in Iran, the ethnic and national diversity in the country will constitute a novel form of "checks and balances". Put differently, since democratic mechanisms are absent in Iran, this novel form of checks and balances will most certainly be conducive to a working democracy.
Transforming Iran into a multinational federation would result in a fundamental change in prevailing ideas about our country. An Iranian multinational federation would put an end to the myth of mono-nationality – a myth that is being maintained by massive military and psychological violence – and correspond with the country's true multinational makeup. This kind of federalism is premised on the recognition of identity as a source of dignity for the individual members of Iran's ethnic and national communities. The solution to the national question in Iran does not lie in improved socio-economic conditions for the individual members of oppressed nations. Rather, a just and long-term solution is political recognition of the national identities of Iran's nations and constitutional safeguards for their national and territorial rights. Contrary to the fear of some people that federalism would result in the breakup of Iran, such a model would create unity out of diversity.
In short, whereas Iran's national diversity has been regarded as a "problem" by successive regimes in Iran and has been subject to violence and forced assimilation, it holds the key to democracy in the country. Thus, it is in the outside world's interest to support Iran's national diversity.
For this strategy to succeed, however, the outside world should give the Iranian democratic and secular Opposition full support. A democratic and federal Iran will not only be at peace with itself, but also with the outside world.
Mustafa Hijri is the General-Secretary of Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI). Founded in 1945, PDKI has struggled for the rights of the Kurdish nation in Iranian Kurdistan. Mr. Hijri's predecessors, Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, were assassinated in Europe by the agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1989 and 1992, respectively.
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